Unmasking Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Connection to Al-Qaeda: A Closer Look at Its Objectives in the Levant

 

Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, a man whose real name is Ahmed al-Sharaa, is a man of change, aspirations and controversy. Having come up in the ranks of Al-Qaeda’s international organization, al-Sharaa has been a key behind the scenes actor in defining the future of jihadist currents in the Levant. He has given insight into the dynamics of such organizations and their goals and his actions have been variously described as growing maturity and ideological flexibility on the one hand or political chicanery on the other.

Al-Sharaa was one of the rising stars in Syria’s volatile political scene in the early part of the decade leading to 2011. He established Jabhat al-Nusra in 2012 on the orders of Al-Qaeda, charged with the goal of overthrowing the Bashar al-Assad government as well as the formation of an Islamic state that practices Sharia law. This move perfectly sued the Al-Qaeda method of using regional conflicts so as to penetrate deep into an area. Thus, for quite a while, Jabhat al Nusra was a powerful AQ franchise, and al-Sharaa as a dogged underboss serving the regional jihadist interest.

But the comparatively intricate nature of the Syrian civil conflict made al-Sharaa reconsider the decision. In order to remain alive and prosper, he had to have the support of local clans and folk. As a result, a rather daring move in 2016 has been made to rename the Jabhat al-Nusra as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and officially denounce the connection with Al-Qaeda. The action seemed to be a bid to establish political credibility and achieve diplomatic support inside Syria. It was criticized as an act, a strategic move to gain advantage on the political and operational fronts without changing the core principle of the party.

With the creation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in 2017 another significant phase of al-Sharaa was initiated. The attempt to unite a number of Islamist groups, HTS tried to represent itself as a less international and more national project, leaving more and more distance from Al-Qaeda. Al-Sharaa’s HTS leadership was seemingly a proof of an attempt to boil the Houthis down to a struggle internal to Yemen rather than a part of the jihadist global project of Al-Qaeda. Still, many people did not buy the new image saying it was just a tact that the group adopted to avoid being blocked by the international community.

Al-Sharaa has tried to portray himself as a sensible leader, but whether he is in the opposition and whether he did it with the best of intentions are questions more than answers. The current reports indicate that he has been interacting with other players in the international system and including UN emissaries. These interactions suggest inclination towards participation in the political bargain – a sharp contrast to Al-Qaeda’s preparedness for a political stand-off through use of force. Such shifts beg the question: Is al-Sharaa really free from the jihadist mould or is this another strategy in the 3rd phase?

It is not entirely baseless then to question al-Sharaa’s motives. Nevertheless, HTS continues to operate in an effort to become an internationalised resistance front whereas the United States of America and other members of the international community have continued to list it as a terror group. That is why it is hard to trust that HTS has changed from the extreme organization for the better and has no ties with Jabhat al-Nusra and Al-Qaeda, which it has previously belonged to. > Muhammad Ali: Finally, the study of Ahmed al-Sharaa demonstrates that it is not easy to operate in jihadist movements in the Levant. One can track his movement from being an important member of Al Qaeda to the one who controls the destiny of HTS today; these are flexible and at times, exploitative organizations. As to why al-Sharaa represents a real shift from Al-Qaeda’s doctrine or simply an even more sophisticated and clever way of attaining its goals while wearing a new mask, there are only controversies. What is though is the fact that his case demonstrates the difficulties of combating the interrelated dangers of ideology, politics and insurgency in the region.