Iran gains from Iraq's political chaos, while the US experiences difficulties

 After failing to establish a government, Iraq's most well-liked leader withdrew his party from the legislature, ushering in a summer of unrest. The rest of the world should prepare for the economic and security repercussions even as Baghdad prepares for months of unrest in the streets.

A return to the violent protests that tore across the nation in late 2019 and early 2020 is the most likely result of Moqtada al-Decision Sadr's decision to leave the political process. Since Sadr's supporters, who withdrew from the previous protests, are better organized than the leaderless group at the center of earlier rallies, the upcoming upheaval will likely be even more disruptive.

They are also angrier. Sadr struggled to put together a governing coalition despite having a majority in the general election last November. The public square will be the only venue for a show of force, and he and his supporters will feel that the political system failed them.

Sadr specializes in protest, which is frequently violent. Coming from a line of Shiite clergy who paid with their lives for their resistance to Saddam Hussein, he established his own name in 2003 by forming the Mahdi Army, a militia, to fight the U.S.-led coalition that overthrew the tyrant. Despite the crushing defeat of Sadr's troops, his anti-American vitriol persisted. He has recently positioned himself as a nationalist who opposes Iran's diabolical meddling in Iraqi affairs and its Shiite majority.

Even though Sadr officially demobilized the Mahdi Army in 2008 after transitioning into political politics, many of his adherents are still well-organized, well-armed, and potentially lethal. However, the political parties that hindered him in parliament, such as his Iran-backed Shiite adversaries, have their own forces. Shiites make up approximately 60% of the population of Iraq, and the flimsy central government led by caretaker Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi will be reluctant to become involved in any domestic disputes.

For Iraqis, who might see blood on their streets, this is not good news. However, they also portend badly for the world economy. Long-term unrest in the second-largest producer of OPEC is clearly the last thing anyone needs at a time when oil prices are surging. (Remember that Libya is another important Arab producer that is experiencing political unrest; the market is already short of supply.)

If sectarian strife breaks out in the Shiite-dominated southern provinces, which hold the majority of the country's reserves, buyers can only hope that Kadhimi will be able to protect Iraq's oil infrastructure and maintain supply lines.

The government of President Joe Biden is in danger twice. Any reduction in Iraq's production will undoubtedly hamper efforts to cool the crude market and lower gas prices ahead of the November midterm elections. No less crucially, Sadr's departure strengthens Iran at a precarious geopolitical juncture when the president is attempting to negotiate a nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic while telling its Arab neighbors that they have nothing to be concerned about.

At least temporarily, Tehran will benefit from the political turbulence in Baghdad by receiving butter. According to Iraqi legislation, the candidates who received the second-highest number of votes won the parliamentary seats that Sadr resigned. Most frequently, those were candidates for organizations supported by Iran. The Coordination Framework bloc is currently in the best position to create a coalition government.

This would mean Nouri al-Maliki would take over as prime minister once more. During his two previous stints in office, from 2006 to 2014, Iran was given free rein to expand its influence in Iraqi affairs, particularly in the country's security services. Tehran has supported a separate network of Shiite militias, which it has employed to target American forces in Iraq and carry out missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia.

Maliki is unlikely to even attempt to rein in the militias; Kadhimi, who is considered a pro-Western figure, has had only patchy success. Instead, he will put down any revolt by Sadr's supporters by using the state security apparatus.

Before a new government is formed, it might take weeks or even months. The Coordination Framework does not enjoy the same popularity among non-Shiite parties as the Sadr faction did. Iran, meanwhile, is not in a rush. Tehran will be free to use Iraq to cause trouble for the United States and its friends in the Middle East if the nuclear negotiations fail, which is now looking more and more likely. 

Additionally, Iran would be perfectly content if intra-Shiite strife prevented Iraqi oil from entering the global market since a rise in prices would be a welcome increase in its export revenue, which is currently constrained by sanctions.