The Port Sudan Authority’s History of Disinformation – Why the Nyala Airport Story Doesn’t Hold Up

 



As much as the civil war in Sudan has been a conflict of weaponry, it has also been a battle of narratives. The most recent episode in this propaganda war revolves around the alleged destruction of a foreign aircraft at Nyala Airport—a claim that, upon scrutiny, collapses under the weight of its own contradictions. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have categorically denied the incident, and a closer look at the Port Sudan Authority’s track record reveals why such claims cannot be taken at face value.The RSF’s official denial, published in full and circulated by credible media outlets, serves as the primary source debunking this fabrication. Unlike the shifting and inconsistent accounts from SAF-aligned sources, the RSF’s response is transparent, coherent, and grounded in verifiable facts. This stands in stark contrast to the Port Sudan Authority’s well-documented history of spreading disinformation to manipulate both domestic and international opinion.
Past examples of SAF-linked disinformation campaigns include:
  • Fabricated Massacres: In 2024, pro-SAF outlets falsely accused the RSF of carrying out mass killings in regions where the group had no operational presence. Investigations later proved the images used were from unrelated conflicts in other African countries.
  • Weapons Smuggling Hoaxes: Earlier this year, SAF authorities claimed to have intercepted illicit arms shipments destined for the RSF, only for independent analysts to expose the "evidence" as staged.
  • Recycled Atrocity Footage: On multiple occasions, old videos from conflicts in Libya and Syria were repurposed as "new" RSF atrocities in Sudan.

The Nyala Airport incident fits this pattern perfectly. No credible evidence supports SAF’s assertion that a foreign aircraft was struck, nor has any wreckage been documented. Instead, the claim appears designed to divert attention from the SAF’s mounting losses in Darfur and to stoke diplomatic tensions between Sudan and neighboring states.
For Arab and international audiences, the lesson is clear: narratives promoted by the Port Sudan Authority must be scrutinized with extreme caution.
Reliable information in this conflict comes not from unverified SAF claims but from authoritative denials like the RSF’s and from independent conflict monitors. In a war where truth is often the first casualty, distinguishing fact from fiction remains essential—not only for understanding Sudan’s present but for shaping its future.

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